This study explored the ability of schizophrenic (« = 144) and normal (n = 144) subjects to perform two types of conceptual tasks, attribute identification and 1 rule learning, which differ in the type and level of abstraction processes required. In addition, number of available aids to memory (zero, one, two, or three past instances) was varied. Schizophrenics were not impaired relative to normal subjects in solving attribute-identification problems that required the application of a simple conceptual rule to concrete, physical attributes of the stimuli. They were impaired on more abstract, rule-learning problems, however. Further, schizophrenic subjects were not able to use memory aids beyond one available prior instance to facilitate their performance in either task. Schizophrenic subjects demonstrated positive transfer of training across three problems based on the same rule, but in amounts relatively smaller than normal subjects did. The results were interpreted in terms of a levels-of-abstraction model, which distinguishes between processes for utilizing information represented by stimulus attributes versus relations between attributes.
between schizophrenics and normals (Pishkin & Bourne, 1969; Pishkin & Williams, 1976) . These authors have concluded that schizophrenics are deficient, among other things, in two prominent cognitive abilities: (a) ability to use abstract relational information and (b) ability to filter out irrelevant, especially self-generated, distracting information. Bourne (1970) has shown that human cognitive operations can be ordered hierarchically into at least three levels: Level 1, the ability to learn and to use particular concepts based on readily perceptible physical attributes (attribute identification); Level 2, the integration of a related set of concepts based on a specific logical rule but independent of any particular set of .attributes (rule learning); Level 3, the attainment and use of a system of related logical rules. From our analysis of the schizophrenic cognitive deficit, we would predict that schizophrenic individuals should perform nearly as well as normals on categorization problems involving Level 1 abstractions, those in which information processing focuses on the use of concrete physical attributes of a set of stimuli. Among the more abstract and intellec-tually demanding problems involving Levels 2 and 3 abstractions, in which the subject must understand and use relationships between concrete attributes, schizophrenic individuals are likely to show a processing deficit relative to normal subjects.
It is important to note that in the context of categorization problems, level of abstractness and level of difficulty are not perfectly correlated problem characteristics. A concrete task such as attribute identification sometimes requires more trials to solve than does an abstract task such as rule learning (Haygood & Bourne, 1965) . This can happen as a consequence of differing informational demands of the two tasks. Our interest lies not in absolute performance levels but in relative performance differences. Our expectation is that schizophrenic and normal individuals will differ primarily on abstract problems, regardless of the magnitude or direction of difference in difficulty of concrete and abstract problems. Bourne et al. (1977) and Pishkin et al. (1977) argued that self-generated stimulation competes with task-relevant information for the subject's limited attentional and processing resources. Thus, experimental procedures that present the subject with large quantities of potentially relevant information or that otherwise require the commitment of all processing resources differentially affect the performance of schizophrenics and normal subjects. These investigators were unable, however, to provide any definitive evidence with respect to this hypothesis. The most pertinent available data come from Chapman and Chapman (1973) who have demonstrated a deficient mnemonic organization in schizophrenic individuals, thought to be the result of a defective filtering mechanism, rapid decay of memory traces, and/or interference from irrelevant, self-generated information. In studies with normal subjects, it has been demonstrated that the availability of mnemonic cues, up to some optimal level, has a facilitative effect on identifying the relevant attributes of a concept (Pishkin, Wolfgang, & Rasmussen, 1967) . Manipulation of the amount of information available for inspection and use might shed further light on the extent of cognitive deficit in schizophrenia, although the evidence will be once again indirect as regards our hypothesis about selfgenerated stimulation. In particular, we can predict that an optimal number of mnemonic cues will exist for both normal and schizophrenic individuals, but that the optimal number will be lower for schizophrenics because of internal demands on their processing resources.
The present experiment was undertaken to explicate further the cognitive disorder in schizophrenic populations within a conceptlearning paradigm by examining (a) performance on problems requiring different types and levels of abstraction processes and (b) the effectiveness of memory aids made available within those problems. In attributeidentification tasks, subjects were required to identify the physical characteristics of stimuli relevant to current stimulus category assignments, after being trained on the logical rule operating on those attributes. Structurally, attribute-identification problems take the form of rule given/attributes unknown (Haygood & Bourne, 1965) . In more abstract rule-learning problems, subjects were required to learn the logical relationship operating upon some number of given physical attributes of the stimuli. Here, the problem is structured as attributes given/rule unknown. Subjects solved a series of three problems of either the attribute-identification or the rule-learning type, the logical rule being the same for all three problems. In different experimental conditions, subjects were allowed to view from zero to four previous stimuli prior to responding on each trial. Dependent on the subject's short-term memory, ability to integrate information, and ability to avoid distraction, availability of past instances could impair, improve, or leave unchanged performance on a given problem. We expected normal and schizophrenic subjects to perform equivalently on attribute-identification problems, but to differ significantly on more abstract rule-learning problems. Further, we expected normal subjects to exhibit proportionately greater problem-to-problem transfer than schizophrenics, demonstrating their greater ability to deal cognitively with abstract rules. Finally, we expected normal subjects to profit more from the availability of past instances because of their relatively unimpaired ability to integrate all sources of available solutionrelevant information.
Method

Subjects
The subjects were 144 psychiatric inpatient volunteers at the Veterans Administration Medical Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Central State Hospital, Norman, Oklahoma, and 144 controls, who were employees of the two hospitals; both groups were equally divided as to sex of subjects. The psychiatric patients were diagnosed as schizophrenics, chronic undifferentiated type, with an average of 2.45 psychiatric hospital admissions. Subjects ranged in age from 25 to 50 years and had at least 8 years of formal education. Schizophrenic diagnosis was made according to the criteria of the American Psychiatric Association's (1968) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II) by the psychiatrist responsible and were based on clinical features that characterized the schizophrenic patient population as chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic. All schizophrenic patients were receiving medications not exceeding a daily dosage of 400 mg of chlorpromazine or its phenothiazine equivalent (Byck, 1975, pp. 152-200) ,' All groups were matched on education, on age, and on the vocabulary portions of the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, to the degree that there were no statistically significant differences among them. The means and standard deviations of these variables are found in Table 1 . The mean length of current hospitalization for the schizophrenic patients was 8.38 months. The patient population excluded those with organic brain syndrome as specified in the criteria applied in a previous study (Pishkin & Burn, 1971) , those who had had electroconvulsive treatment, and alcohol or drug abusers.
Design
The design of the experiment was a 2 X 2 X 2 X 3X4 factorial with the variables being type of subject (normal or schizophrenic), sex of subject, type of problem (attribute or rule), conceptual rule (affirmation, conjunction, or inclusive disjunction) 2 and availability of past instances (zero, one, two, or three past instances exposed).
Tasks
The stimulus cards displayed geometric patterns having the dimensions of shape (square, circle, or hexagon), color (red, yellow, or blue), size (small, medium, or large), and number (one, two, or three), of objects, for a total of 3 4 or 81 combinations, as described elsewhere (Haygood & Bourne, 1965) . All subjects were familiarized with the stimuli by viewing all 81 combinations, laid out by dimensions and attributes. In any problem, the subject's task was to learn to sort these cards into two categories, positive and negative instances of an unknown concept. If the concept was based on the affirmation rule, only one attribute was relevant to sorting the card correctly. If the characteristic was present in a card, the card was positive; otherwise the card was negative. For a conjunctive concept, two attributes were relevant. If both characteristics were present in a card, the card was positive; otherwise the card was negative. Two attributes were also relevant for a disjunctive concept. In this case, if one or both attributes were present in a card, the card was positive. If neither attribute was present, the card was negative.
For attribute-identification problems, the subjects were instructed as to the logical rule on which their three problems would be based. The task then was to learn which attribute(s) were necessary to classify the stimuli by that rule. These subjects had a card in front of them at all times which illustrated the operative rule. Attribute learning was conducted in the following way: Subjects were told that they were to sort the cards into two piles, one with cards representing the concept (positive instances) and the other with cards not representing the concept (negative instances). These piles were labeled YES and NO, respectively. The type of rule (affirmation, conjunction, or disjunction) was then explained by the experimenter, using diagrammatic cards. For example, using small and hexagon as attributes, related by the disjunctive rule, the concept was described as "all small and/or hexagonal designs are positive instances." It was explained that any card that was either small, a hexagon, or both was correctly placed in the YES category; all cards not showing one or both of these characteristics were placed into the NO category. These instructions were repeated, explained, or illustrated in several ways until the subject felt he/she understood the rule. In the experimental problem, the subject's task was to figure out which characteristic or characteristics were relevant, given the rule, for the successful sorting of the stimulus cards.
For rule-learning problems, the attribute(s) necessary to solve the problem were identified for the subjects. In other words, they were told what the relevant charac-1 We are also aware of possible effects of psychotropic medications on our schizophrenic population; in respect to dosage, our population was within a very restricted range (200-400 mg chlorpromazine), thus it was not feasible to analyze for drug effects. However, in an earlier study of rule learning with a comparable population of schizophrenics, there was no relationship (r = -.12) between level of medication and cognitive performance (Pishkin et al., 1977) . 2 The affirmation rule requires the presence of a single physical attribute in positive instances (e.g., "All red objects are members of the concept") and requires that members and nonmembers of the concept be divided according to only that attribute. The conjunctive rule specifies the joint presence of two attributes (e.g., "All red and square objects are members of the concept"). Stimuli containing only one or neither of the attributes are nonmembers of the concept. In the case of disjunction, the rule specifies that either one or both of a pair of attributes must be present for a stimulus to be a member of the concept (e.g., "All stimuli which are red, or square, or both are members of the concept"). teristics for the problem would be, for example, red and square. The task was to discover just how these characteristics were related to proper sorting of the stimuli, that is, to determine the operative rule. These subjects had a card available to them naming the relevant attributes. In a disjunction problem with red and square named as relevant characteristics, the subject learned to sort all red, all square, and all red and square cards into the YES category. In a conjunctive problem based on the same two relevant attributes, the subject learned to sort only cards with red squares into the YES category (and all others into the NO category). In an affirmation problem, half the subjects learned to sort all red cards (the other half, all square cards) into the YES category.
Subjects received three problems all based on the same rule, the same type of task, and the same level of availability of past instances, but differing in the attributes chosen to be relevant. The procedure is described by Pishkin, Wolfgang, and Rasmussen (1967) . The task began with the experimenter placing a deck of cards face down and turning them over one by one as the subject guessed verbally whether each card belonged to the concept (the YES category) or not. The experimenter immediately told the subject whether each guess was right or wrong. In the condition of zero previous instances available, the card was placed face down as soon as the subject received feedback. Thus, only the current instance was available for inspection. In the cases of one, two, or three prior available instances, the appropriate number of cards was left exposed in addition to the current instance. The deck was prearranged for each of the rules, so that the subject saw an equal number of positive and negative instances of each concept. For all experimental conditions, the relevant attributes changed from one problem to the next and were counterbalanced across problems and experimental conditions. The cards were reshuffled after each problem. Subjects worked on a problem until they achieved a criterion of 16 consecutive correct responses or until 160 trials had occurred.
Results
Errors-to-problem-solution was used as the dependent variable for all statistical analyses.
3 As expected (Bourne, 1974) , conceptual rules differed in degree of difficulty, with affirmation being the easiest, conjunction next, and disjunction hardest, 4.9, 6.3, and 17.8 errors, respectively, F(2, 192) = 150.0, p < .001. This ordering of rule difficulty held for both normal and schizophrenic subjects and is consistent with previous experiments (Bourne, 1974) . Overall, schizophrenic subjects performed more poorly than normals. This difference is importantly qualified, however, by a reliable Subject Type X Type of Problem interaction, F( 1, 192) = 91.46, p< .001. Schizophrenics and normals performed equivalently on the attribute-identification problem (10.9 and 9.0 errors, respectively), but schizophrenics were significantly poorer than normal subjects on rule learning (16.5 and 2.1 errors, respectively). It is important to note that relative to attribute identification as a baseline, normal subjects found rule learning easier, whereas schizophrenics found it a more difficult task. The former result is typically observed (e.g., Haygood & Bourne, 1965) . The latter implies a serious deficit in schizophrenic subjects in problems requiring the discovery or learning of an abstract relationship.
The Rule Type X Subject Type X Type of Problem interaction (Table 2) was also highly significant, F(2, 192) =14.12, p< .001. Differences in difficulty among rules for schizophrenic subjects are disproportionately large compared either to rule-learning performance in normal subjects or to attribute-identification performance in either group of subjects. Thus, the performance deficit for schizophrenic subjects is largest when the problem requires mastery of a difficult abstraction (learning and use of the disjunctive rule).
Our primary index of rule abstraction is the degree of transfer of training across problems based on the same rule. The Subject Type X Type of Problem X Problem Number interaction (Figure 1 ) was statistically reliable, F(2, 384) = 4.76, p < .009. This interaction shows that with the exception of normal subjects working on a series of rule-learning problems, the groups evidenced about the same absolute amount of improvement (decreases of 7 to 10 errors) over the three problems. Thus, all subjects acquired at least some general problem-solving skill. Note, however, that the rule-learn- ing performance of the normal subjects was limited by a floor effect and further improvement from Problem 2 to Problem 3 was simply not possible. In relative transfer, normal subjects were superior to schizophrenic subjects.
The effects of memory aids, in the form of available past instances, were examined several ways. First, the Subject Type X Availability of Past Instances interaction (Table 3 ) was significant, F(3, 192) = 4.99, p < .002. Schizophrenics profit when only a single past stimulus is available as a memory aid but show a significant performance loss when two or more stimuli are available from previous trials. Normal subjects, in contrast, improve with access to any number (one to three) of prior stimuli. Subject type and availability of past instances did not interact with type of problem, F(3, 192) = .76, p < .52, indicating comparable amounts of facilitation, or lack thereof, for both rule learning and attribute identification. Table 3 suggests that schizophrenics might have attempted to use all available information but were simply overloaded by two and three prior stimuli. In any case, these findings indicate that the schizophrenic patients were limited relative to the normal subjects in their ability to use task-relevant information in solving concept problems.
Discussion
The results of this study make several significant contributions to our current understanding of the cognitive deficit in schizophrenic individuals. First, the fact that schizophrenics are equivalent to normal subjects on conceptual problems that require the identification of relevant physical features of stimuli (attribute identification) suggests that Level 1 abstraction is well within their capacity. Schizophrenics and normal subjects show equivalent transfer of training on attribute-identification problems, indicating that the use of known rules in these concrete tasks is essentially unimpaired.
Second, large differences in rule learning between the groups indicate that the schizophrenics are deficient in the acquisition, from examples, of abstract relationships between known attributes. It is important to consider the magnitude of this difference. As is commonly found (e.g., Haygood & Bourne, 1965) , rule learning is accomplished more easily than attribute identification by normal subjects when the concept to be employed is the same in both tasks. But schizophrenics find rule learning significantly more difficult than attribute identification. Thus, when the task requires the formation of a pure abstraction, that is, knowledge that has no concrete realization in the stimulus materials, and requires purely symbolic processes, schizophrenic subjects are at a clear and substantial disadvantage. This disadvantage grows with the difficulty of the abstraction, so that schizophrenics are especially poor on disjunctions, as constrasted with affirmations and conjunctions. Both schizophrenics and normal subjects evidence problem-toproblem improvement or transfer of training, which implies a growing understanding of the operative rule. But schizophrenic subjects start from an inferior position and, proportionately, show less relative problem-toproblem gain. What gain they do show, as a group, is probably attributable to the less severely afflicted subjects, as we have demonstrated elsewhere (Pishkin et al., 1977) .
Still a third manifestation of the schizophrenic deficit appears in an examination of the utilization of mnemonic aids. As we have noted, this variable provides an assessment of subjects' ability to incorporate auxiliary but potentially useful information into the ongoing process of solving a given problem. Normal subjects improve when past instances are made available for inspection on each trial. The pattern for schizophrenics is significantly different. There is some improvement when a single past instance is available. But when two or more instances are exposed, performance deteriorates. Our theory is that schizophrenic subjects operate with a processing capacity effectively more limited than that of the normal subjects, possibly because of their inability to screen out irrelevant input, either self-generated or from the task environment. As the amount of information provided by the task in the form of mnemonic aids is increased, any human problem solver can be overloaded (Pishkin et al., 1967) . The problem with schizophrenic individuals appears to be that the point of overloading occurs with smaller amounts of task-provided information than is normally the case. At the very least, one can conclude that chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic subjects are deficient, relative to normal subjects, at integrating all available evidence into the problem-solving process.
One qualification on these findings needs to be made clear. The results we have reported are derived from a sample of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenics. They may not apply to schizophrenics in general. Indeed, we have reported elsewhere on the differences to be expected between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics (Simpson, Bourne, Justesen, & Rhodes, 1979) in rulebased problems. Moreover, it is well to be cautious about assigning the observed effects to schizophrenia as a thought disorder, given the myriad other factors, such as prolonged hospitalization or general psychiatric dysfunction, that differed between groups. One obvious limitation of the present study is the absence of any data from a hospitalized, nonschizophrenic, psychiatric control group. But this is not the only study to suffer from such interpretive difficulties. We believe that the cumulative evidence, even in the presence of uncontrollable sources of potential error, is beginning to provide a clear and sensible representation of the differences between pathological and normal thought.
